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Agency-1964 Tennessee Survey
John S. Beasley, 11*
I. LimrrY OF THE PINCIPAL TO Trhm PARTmS
II. Lu~rrr OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT
III. Lxn rrnn OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL
During the period covered by this Survey several cases have raised
rather interesting points for consideration under the law of agency.
On one occasion the Tennessee Supreme Court declined the opportunity
of joining the ranks of the majority of states in moving toward a more
modern rule on employer's liability with respect to an employee's child
injured negligently by the employee. In this and other decisions, the
courts have followed Tennessee precedent rather closely, with the result
that there are few changes in the law of agency.
I. LIAmrry OF THE PRINCIPAL TO TIRD PA TiEs
In Smith v. Henson,' tort suits against the master by Smith as next
friend of an injured minor child and as administrator of the estate of
a deceased minor child were barred because the negligence involved
was that of the servant-mother.2 The mother was employed for general
housework, and on the particular occasion was to drive defendant to
work, return to his home, and wash his car. The home was located on
a steep hill, and she parked the car on the inclined driveway. Later
the car rolled down the drive and struck her two minor children, killing
the girl and injuring the boy. The trial court sustained demurrers to
both suits. In affirming, the supreme court held that the declaration
stated no act of proximate negligence by defendant which would
make him liable and that if he were liable at all, it would be because
of the negligence of the servant-mother under the doctrine of res-
pondeat superior.3 With respect to the injured minor child the court,
denying liability, restated the Tennessee rule, saying:
It has also long been the rule in this State that a minor may not recover
damages against a principal because of the negligent acts of the parent of
0 Associate Dean, Vanderbilt University.
1. 381 S.W.2d 892 (Tenn. 1964).
2. The action was brought under the Tennessee wrongful death statute. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 20-607 (1956).
3. "We agree that the rule in Tennessee is that the master (Henson in this case)
is liable for the negligent act of his servant (Mrs. Kendrick), solely upon the doctrine of
respondeat superior." 381 S.W.2d at 897.
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a minor, wlich parent at the time was acting as the agent of the principal.
4
The action brought by the administrator for the dead child was also
barred, since the mother would be the beneficiary of any damages,
profiting thereby from her own negligence.5
Tennessee thus continues to retain the old rule that liability of
the master for torts of the servant is entirely derivative and rests
solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. The master is not
liable unless the servant is liable,6 and whatever personal immunity
the servant enjoys extends to the master.7 This has been held even
where the master is guilty of independent negligence himself.8 This
is in sharp contrast to the modem and majority view, permitting re-
covery from the master for torts of the servant acting in the course of
his employment, despite the servants personal immunity.9
The special relationship between a sheriff and his deputy has given
rise to a variety of cases in which torts of the deputy have been
imputed to the sheriff and his surety. Though both sheriff and
deputy are employees or officials of the county government, there is
sometimes a relationship which seems to be that of master-servant,
or principal-agent. The sheriff is generally held for the deputy's acts
by virtue of office, but not for those done under color of office. While
the deputy's torts are not ordinarily imputed to the sheriff under the
general rules of respondeat superior, 0 the grounds on which liability
is imputed vary, and there is much confusion. A well-reasoned opinion
in Waters v. Bates," clears the picture somewhat for Tennessee. In this
case Waters and her husband sued the deputy, the sheriff and his
surety for injuries she sustained when the deputy negligently drove
his patrol car into her car while on duty. The jury found for plaintiffs,
4. Id. at 897.
5. The court cites with approval Bamberger v. Citizens' St. Ry., 95 Tenn. 18,
37, 31 S.W. 163, 168 (1895), where it was said: "The underlying principle in the
whole matter is that no one shall profit by his own negligence, and to allow the
father, who has been guilty of negligence, to recover, notwithstanding that negligence,
when he brings the suit as administrator, although he could not do so in his own right,
would defeat this underlying principle by a mere change of form, when the entire
recovery, in either event, goes to him alone."
6. A. B. Loveman Co. v. Bayless, 128 Tenn. 307, 160 S.W. 841 (1913).
7. Stewart v. Craig, 208 Tenn. 212, 344 S.W.2d 761 (1961); Raines v. Mercer, 165
Tenn. 415, 55 S.W.2d 263 (1932).
8. Graham v. Miller, 182 Tenn. 434, 187 S.W.2d 622 (1945). But see Jenkins v.
General Cab Co., 175 Tenn. 409, 135 S.W.2d 448 (1940), holding a cab company
liable for an assault on a passenger by passenger's husband, the cab's driver, on the
ground that a common carrier has a non-delegable duty to carry passengers safely.
9. Kowaleski v. Kowaleski, 227 Ore. 45, 361 P.2d 64 (1961); RESTATjEMNT
(SEcoND), AG'cy § 217(b) (ii) (1959).
10. 1 MEcHEm, AcENcr § 1502 (2d ed. 1914).
11. 227 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Tenn. 1964).
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but a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was sustained.
The court adopted the test used in Ivy v. Osborne,12 where it was
said:
In order to carry liability to the principal, the act of the deputy must be
by virtue of the office, and in interpreting this rule it is held that, in order
for a deputy's act to have that character, it must be done in an attempt to
serve or execute a process, or under a statute giving him the right to arrest
without a warrant, and if he acts otherwise, he is doing so as an individual.
13
Cases subsequent to Ivy have tended to muddy the waters some-
what, in that they rely on Ivy but extend the rule to include failure
to perform an official duty to a prisoner by mistreating him,14 and firing
upon and killing a fleeing misdemeanant prior to the making of a
lawful arrest.'5 In Jones v. State,'6 where death resulted when the
deputy shot out the tire of a fleeing car in the course of making an
arrest for the commission of a misdemeanor, the court said: -The
Court of Appeals' final conclusion is correct upon the theory (1) that
the said Deputies were acting officially, and that the Sheriff ratified the
wrongful act; (2) the Sheriff assigned them an official car to patrol
the highways of Knox County, and there is material evidence that
they were so acting.". 7 This case and the later case of State ex rel.
Coffelt v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,'8 while citing Ivy, speak
of the imputation of liability to the 'sheriff and his surety in terms of
agency. The court in the Waters case rejects this view, returning, in
effect, to the rather narrow test put forth in Ivy.'9
One other case is treated in this section, partially because it arose
from a master-servant relationship, and partly because it fits really no-
where else in the present survey. In Dispeker v. New Southern Hotel
Co.,20 the Supreme Court of Tennessee decided that theft of a guest's
car from a hotel's unattended lot by an off duty employee would sup-
port an action ex contractu for breach of a bailment contract, regard-
less of negligence. The facts are substantially less interesting than
12. 152 Tenn. 470, 279 S.W. 384 (1926).
13. Id. at 473, 279 S.W. at 384.
14. State ex rel. Morris v. National Sur. Co., 162 Tenn. 547, 39 S.W.2d 581 (1931).
15. State ex rel. Blanchard v. Fisher, 193 Tenn. 147, 245 S.W.2d 179 (1951).
16. 194 Tenn. 534, 253 S.W.2d 740 (1952).
17. Id. at 540, 253 S.W.2d at 742.
18. 44 Tenn. App. 405, 314 S.W.2d 161 (M.S. 1958).
19. "[N]owhere have the Tennessee cases defined virtue of office in terms synonymous
with 'scope of employment' as those terms are used in the law of agency. Nowhere
yet has the case of Ivy v. Osborne been cited except with full approval. In the Ivy case
the Court stated: 'The Tennessee courts follow the rule last stated, upon the reason-
ing that the deputy acts in lieu of the sheriff and in his name, and representing the
sheriff officially, and not as an agent, the authority of the ,deputy is limited to official
acts.'" Supra note 11, at 467 (Emphasis added.) .1
20. 373 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. App. W.S. 196&), cert. denied, 373 S.W.2d 904 (1963).
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the holding. Dispeker stopped overnight at defendant hotel, turning
her car over to Govan, defendant's employee, to park in the hotel's
lot. Later, off duty, Govan took the car and wrecked it. In the lower
court the chancellor, dismissing the bill, held that "the common law
rule making an innkeeper practically an insurer of the property of its
guests is not applicable since the automobile was outside the inn in
an open, unattended parking lot."2' 1 The relationship was one of bail-
ment for hire, said the court, finding no negligence on the part of the
hotel and thus no liability. No bill of exceptions was filed, but an
appeal on the technical record was perfected. The Court of Appeals,
Western Section, reversed the chancellor, holding that the automobile
was infra hospitium, and that defendant's "responsibility and liability
continued up to and including the time when Fred Govan, even though
off duty, returned to the parking lot, took the car out, and wrecked
it."2 2 Since no bill of exceptions was filed, the issue of negligence was
settled in defendant's favor. In denying certiorari, the supreme court
did not deem it necessary to reach the question whether an auto
parked in an open unattended lot was infra hospitium, but held that,
irrespective of negligence, the hotel was liable for breach of the
bailment by something "quite analagous to misdelivery."3
It is elementary that when an article is bailed, a contract, express
or implied, arises for its safekeeping and return.24 Liability for damage
to the bailed article or for inability to deliver it is usually predicated
on negligence or failure to exercise due care, unless the bailed article
is infra hospitium in which case the bailee is virtually an insurer. But
liability for misdelivery is uniformly imposed.26 The court in the in-
stant case, imposing liability, says:
It was only through defendant's unfortunate choice of employee that the
automobile was damaged. Thus, when the automobile was turned over to
Govan, then off-duty, an act quite analagous to misdelivery took place,
imposing absolute liability upon the bailee for the loss or damage occasioned
thereby. Therefore, we hold that the defendant hotel is liable for misdelivery
and the law will not inquire whether it did so in good faith or through
negligence or otherwise.27
Strictly speaking, one wonders if the automobile was "turned over
21. Id. at 899 (quoting decree of Chancery Court of Madison County, Tennessee).
22. Id. at 903.
23. Dispeker v. New So. Hotel Co., 373 S.W.2d 904, 910 (1963).
24. 8 Am. Jur. 2d Bailments § 2 (1963).
25. Kallish v. Meyer Hotel Co., 182 Tenn. 29, 184 S.W.2d 45 (1944); see Sewell
v. Mountain View Hotel, Inc., 45 Tenn. App. 604, 325 S.W.2d 626 (E.S. 1959); Andrew
Jackson Hotel, Inc., v. Platt, 19 Tenn. App. 360, 89 S.V.2d 179 (M.S. 1935).
26. 8 Am. Jun. 2d Bailments § 167 (1963). The court quotes this section and relies
on it. See Colyar v. Taylor, 41 Tenn. 372 (1860) (holding misdelivery a conversion).
27. Dispeker v. New So. Hotel Co., supra note 23.
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to Govan, then off-duty." It will remain for future decisions to indicate
whether liability for "misdelivery" will be imposed where the car is
taken by someone other than an off-duty employee.
II. Li~mrry OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT
Slesinger v. Glatt,8 was a suit in chancery to recover a real estate
brokerage commission. Glatt had listed a piece of property for sale
with Slesinger, who had previously leased the property to Sunray for
her. The lease was still in effect and granted Sunray the right to
purchase the land within thirty days of notice than an offer acceptable
to Glatt had been made, at the price offered. Over a period of several
months Slesinger presented unacceptable offers to buy the property,
and in July 1961, he produced a signed offer to buy at an acceptable
figure. Glatt notified Sunray which bought the property at that figure.
Slesinger sued to recover his brokerage commission. The Court of
Appeals, Western Section, reversed the chancellor, holding that the
broker was entitled to his commission under two theories: (1) that
there was a contract to pay the commission if complainant procured a
purchaser, which he did; and (2) that complainant was entitled to
the commission under the'principle of services rendered or quantum
meruit.
Generally a broker is entitled to his commission when he produces
a buyer ready, willing and able to buy.2 9 Obviously, if the agreement
was to pay the commission upon production of such an individual
regardless of whether the owner sold to him, defendant would be
liable in this case for the commission since the contract would have
been fulfilled. The case most nearly in point, though not cited, is
Brown v. Beeson,3 where defendant was conditionally bound not to
sell land to his cotenants. An independent buyer acceptable to the
owner was produced by the broker, following which cotenants
exercised their right to purchase. The court held the commission due.31
28. 373 S.W.2d 220 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
29. MECmwM, AGEcCY § 560 (4th ed. 1952).
30. 31 Tenn. App. 602, 218 S.W.2d 997 (E.S. 1948).
31. "Defendant was already conditionally bound to sell to the cotenants. In that
event, and as it turned out, no sale could be made to complainant's client or due to
his efforts. From defendant's standpoint the primary purpose of the contract was to
boost the price of the property by forcing the cotenants to pay more or, if they refused
to pay more, by selling to a third party at a higher price. Doubtless realizing that a
broker would not be interested in working up a sale only to lose it by having the
cotenants match the offer of his client, it was clearly stated in the original letter that in
that event it would be considered that Complainant would be entitled to commis-
sion.... When complainant ... produced a bona fide bid and defendant sold to the
cotenants at the price bid, complainant, under the terms of the contract, became entitled
to commission." Id. at 606-08, 218 S.W.2d at 999-1000.
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Under the theory of quantum meruit the court is again on sound
ground in awarding a recovery. If the party giving the performance
reasonably expects to be paid, if he confers a benefit on the recipient of
the performance, and if he was not a volunteer, then he has a claim
in quasi-contract.32 Under the facts in the instant case Slesinger clearly
conferred a benefit on Glatt, and he was not a volunteer. It seems
likely that he also expected to be paid.
Quantum meruit was also the basis for an agent's claim against the
principal in Kennon v. Commercial Standard Insurance Co. 33 The
agent was engaged to investigate a workmen's compensation claim; he
submitted a statement for more than 3,000 dollars. The principal
contested the amount as excessive and refused to pay. At trial, four
experts set the worth of his service at 350 dollars, 500 dollars, 700
dollars and 1035.53 dollars. The chancellor hearing the cause on
deposition 4 awarded complainant 2500 dollars. On appeal, the judg-
ment was decreased to 1500 dollars, the court fixing the amount by
averaging the figures entered in testimony with complainant's own
figure, and getting 1118.33 dollars, then arbitrarily raising this to 1500
dollars.3 5
Generally, in the absence of an agreed compensation, the agent is
entitled to the fair value or reasonable worth of his services.3 In
deciding the value, expert opinion may certainly be used.31 It then
becomes a question of evidence as to what is reasonable. In the
instant case, the average of the figures submitted by the disinterested
experts was 646.34 dollars. Complainant's evidence must have been
strong indeed to support an award two and a half times that amount.
32. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTrS §§ 3, 3A (3d ed. 1957); RESTATEMmT (SECOND),
AGENCY § 448 (1959). See Hartman, Contracts-1961 Tennessee Survey, 14 VAND.
L. REV. 1196, 1198 (1961).
33. 376 S.W.2d 703 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1963).
34. The court of appeals, citing cases recognizing the weight to which a chancellor's
conclusions, based on hearing witnesses face to face, was entitled, said: "In the instant
cause the case was heard on depositions, and while that rule applies as stated, that
we do give great weight to the Chancellor's opinion, certainly it does not apply with
that strictness of a case heard before the Chancellor on oral testimony where he does
see the witnesses face to face." Id. at 711.
35. "Should we take the total sum arrived at by the four experts plus the figure
arrived at by the complainant, and add them we would .... average $1118.33. We are
not willing to fix the services of complainant at such amount, but we do conclude that
the value of the services when giving reasonable consideration to the estimates fixed
by these experts and to their testimony in an effort to arrive at a figure which is
fair and equitable for the services of complainant, taking into consideration that he is
the one that performed the service and that some greater weight should be given his
testimony than could be attributed to either one of the four experts standing alone, we
feel his services should be fixed at $1500.00.. -.." Id. at 712.
36. 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 248 (1963); IESTATEMENT (SEcOND), AGENCY § 443
(1959).
37. MxcHm r, AGENCY § 545 (4th ed. 1952).
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McCall v. Oldenburge presented the question of duration of an
implied contract of hire. Complainants were manufacturers' repre-
sentatives representing principals in the "soft goods" business. In
1957, they hired defendant Oldenburg to develop a "hardgoods" divi-
sion, the oral agreement being to pay him a certain sum per month
and half of all commissions of the division. As the division grew it
became necessary to add to it defendant Shomaker and later defend-
ant Deakins. Retainers were paid the new men by complainants and
Oldenburg monthly, travel expenses throughout being borne by the
individual defendants. During April and early May of 1963 de-
fendants conferred with complainants about a suggested, revision of
percentages to be paid them, but nothing came of the discussion. On
May 13, 1963, defendants submitted a formal plan for revision, re-
questing a reply by a certain time. When the answer was not forth-
coming, they formally dissociated themselves from complainants. The
case arose over commissions earned prior to May 13 but not received
until later; the complainants contended that defendant's share had
been forfeited by virtue of the termination of employment without
a month's notice.
The case turned on the indefiniteness of the hiring. The English rule
is that an indefinite hiring is one for a year,39 while in the United
States, generally, an indefinite hiring is one at the will of both parties
and terminable at any time. 4 Various factors tend to indicate whether
the hiring is really for a term or is actually indefinite. Periodic com-
pensation tends to indicate a definite period of employment, and a
number of Tennessee cases have dealt with this problem. Delzell v.
Pope,41 the most recent Tennessee case directly in point, found an
implied contract of hiring for a year in circumstances where there
was an annual salary, complainant had already been an employee for
several years, and where he was expected to develop and carry out
a program running through the year. The court in that case stated
the rule that a hiring at a certain price per month or year "is a hiring
for that period, provided there are no circumstances to the contrary."42
The instant case is essentially within the limits of Deizell, sharpening
the rule somewhat by finding no definite term even where monthly
retainers were paid. Intention of the parties, evidenced by all the
circumstances, appears to control the duration of an implied contract
of hiring in Tennessee.
38. 382 S.W.2d 537 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1964).
39. See Annot., 100 A.L.R. 834 (1936); Annot., 11 A.L.R. 469 (1921).
40. Combs v. Standard Oil Co., 166 Tenn. 88, 59 S.W.2d 525 (1933); Godson v.
MacFadden, 162 Tenn. 528, 39 S.W.2d 287 (1931); Savage v. Spur Distributing Co., 22
Tenn. App. 27, 228 S.W.2d 122 (M.S. 1949).
41. 200 Tenn. 641, 294 S.W.2d 690 (1955).
42. Id. at 651, 294 S.W.2d at 694.
1965 ] AGENCY 1967
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
III. LLBirry OF AGENT TO PPONCIAL
In Gay & Taylor, Inc. v. American Casualty Co., 43 the principal
sought to recover from its agent, an independent lay adjustment firm,
the amount of a default judgment entered against its insured as a
result of the adjuster's negligent failure to forward to the plaintiff's
attorney the claim file upon which the defense would have been made.
The trial court awarded the plaintiff insurance company the amount
it had been charged in the default judgment previously entered
against its insured. In modifying the decision, the court of appeals
held that the agent adjustment firm had indeed been negligent in
failing to forward the file, that the negligence had resulted in the
default judgment having been entered against plaintiff's insured, but
that since it was clear that had the file been forwarded, the insured
would have had no meritorious defense to the suit, no greater damage
to plaintiff had been sustained as a result of defendant's negligence.
While the decision probably could have been supported under ordi-
nary rules of agency," the facts are so close to those normally found
in attorney-client cases that the court analogized extensively. Gen-
erally, an attorney is liable to his client for negligence only when the
client can prove that he suffered actual damages proximately caused
by this negligence. 5 Awarding a nominal sum for breach of contract
the court said: "We are of the opinion, therefore, that there is no
evidence in the record in the present case that the admitted mis-
conduct of the defendant was followed by any actual loss or damage
to the plaintiff, and that the entry of the 10,500 dollar judgment by
the trial court was error.""
43. 381 S.W.2d 304 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1963).
44. See 35 Am. Jun. Master & Servant § 20 (1941).
45. RESTATEME (SEcoND), AGENcy § 379, comment b, § 401 (1959). Maryland
Cas. Co. v. Price, 231 Fed. 397 (4th Cir. 1916); Masters v. Dunstan, 256 N.C. 520,
124 S.E.2d 574 (1962); Collier v. Pulliam, 81 Tenn. 114 (1884).
46. 381 S.W.2d at 307.
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